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Survival of Rights of Action After Corporate Merger
A corporation, like a natural person, may sue anyone who
wrongs it, even its own officers or directors. When the corporate directors approve such legal action, the suit is deemed "primary."'
When they do not approve, as might happen if a board member is
the prospective defendant,2 one or more shareholders may be able to
sue on behalf of the corporation. 3 Such actions, devised by the equity courts,4 are termed "derivative."5
Once a corporation ceases to exist, most courts permit neither
1. The directors' approval is normally needed for primary suits. See United Copper Sec.
Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64 (1917); 2 w. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 535 (rev. vol. 1969).
2. The corporate officers, directors, and controlling shareholders are usually defendants in
derivative suits, but an eligible shareholder may derivatively sue other parties who have
wronged the corporation. But see Note, JJemand on JJirectors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a JJerivative Suit, 73 HARV. L. REV. 746, 760 n.82 (1960) (arguing that the derivative suit
is an improper procedure for claims against third parties).
3. In some circumstances, courts will not permit derivative suits. For example, if a disinterested board of directors, exercising reasonable business judgment, decides not to pursue an
action, shareholders may not bring it derivatively. See, e.g., Ash v. International Business
Machs., Inc., 353 F.2d 491, 492-93 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966); Swanson v.
Traer, 249 F.2d 854, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1957); H. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS
§ 147 (rev. ed. 1946). Cf. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979) (the decision of independent
directors to terminate a nonfrivolous derivative suit is not inconsistent with the Investment
Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 through -52 (1976)).
4. See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970); Koster v. (American) Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 522-23 (1947); Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331,
341-44 (1855); Miller v. Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See generally
Prunty, The Shareholders' JJerivative Suit: Notes on its JJerivation, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980
(1957).
5. It is important to distinguish between corporate causes of action and personal (or direct)
causes of action. When the basis of the suit is a wrong to the corporation, the cause of action is
corporate; a shareholder may pursue such a claim only through a derivative suit. See, e.g.,
Press v. Marvalan Indus., Inc., 468 F. Supp. 1072, 1078 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). When the gravamen
of the action is injury to a shareholder as an individual, he must pursue the action directly, not
derivatively. See, e.g., Polako.lfv. Delaware Steeplechase & Race Assn., 254 F. Supp. 574, 580
(D. Del. 1966); 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note I,§ 5911 (rev. vol. 1970). See generally Note,
JJistinguishing Between JJirect and JJerivative Shareholder Suits, 110 U. PA. L. REV, 1147
(1962). The distinction is difficult to apply; there are " 'borderline cases which are more or less
troublesome to classify."' Eisenberg v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 451 F.2d 267, 269 (2d Cir.
1971) (quoting 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 5911). Yet, the distinction is important, even
for actions under the federal securities laws. See 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 5923.2. A
table highlighting the differences between derivative and class suits is provided in Kennedy,
Securities Class and JJerivative Actions in the United States JJistrict Courtfor the Northern .Dis•
trict of Texas: An Empirical Study, 14 Hous. L. REV. 769, 778-80 (1977). Class suits and
derivative suits have important tactical differences:
[A] derivative suit may be essential for rescission. And a derivative suit can have the
important tactical advantage of relieving plaintiff from the cost of giving notice of pendency, which would fall on him in a class action, but such notice is not required in a
derivative case. Moreover, a derivative suit does not have requirements like numerosity
(which may be unattainable when the acquired company was closely held) and predomi•
nance of common questions over individual questions. Fed. R. C1v. P. 23(a)(l), (b)(3).
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primary nor derivative suits to be brought in its name. If a merger6
precipitates that corporate demise, courts usually hold that standing
to sue, like other assets of the "merged"7 corporation, passes to the
surviving corporation. This Note ponders the merit of that rule of
passage.
Section I categorizes the cases defining the rule of passage. 8
Some courts have steadfastly adhered to the rule and denied standing to the merged corporation's shareholders. Other courts, fearing
that the rule would preclude meritorious actions, have created exceptions allowing these shareholders to sue despite the merger. Unfortunately, no court has provided satisfactory criteria for determ.in,!.ng
Nor does it permit opt outs . . . , which reduce potential recovery and settlement recovery
and leverage.
2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD§ 6.5(273)(1) (Supp. 1977).
6. This Note will not use "merger" in the technical sense of that term; rather, it will use the
term to describe any transaction that unites two or more corporations into a single surviving
corporation. Professor Conard has used the term "fusion" to express the same idea. See A.
CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTNE § 119 (1976). The corporation that operates the
business after the merger will be called the "surviving corporation" or "survivor." The corporation that ceases to exist because of the transaction will be called the "merged" corporation.
Although there are numerous variations, most corporate mergers follow three basic patterns. First, "statutory mergers" or "consolidations" are one-step joinders of two corporations
into a surviving corporation by operation of state statutory law. See, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT§§ 71-72 (1953). Second, in a "share exchange," one corporation trades some
of its shares for all or most of the shares of the other, which then becomes a subsidiary. The
parent then votes to merge the subsidiary into itself. See, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP.
ACT§ 72-A (1953). Third, in a "sale of assets" 'substantially all assets of one corporation are
exchanged with the survivor for cash, shares, or other property. The former corporation is
then liquidated, and the cash, shares, or property are distributed to the shareholders of that
corporation. (Sales of assets are not always followed by liquidation of the seller, but this Note
will consider only those sales that are.) See, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr § 79
(1953). See generally A. CONARD, supra, § 119. See also I.R.C. § 368(a)(l)(A)-(C) (tax-free
reorganizations).
.
Some courts attach great significance to the form of the merger. See, e.g., Hariton v. Arco
Elec., Inc., 40 Del. Ch. 326, 182 A.2d 22 (Ct. Ch. 1962), a.ffd., 41 Del. Ch. 74, 188 A.2d 123
(Sup. Ct. 1963). Other courts have been more flexible and have treated transactions that
amount to a merger as mergers. See, e.g., Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. 406,244
N.W.2d 873 (1976). In treating the rule of passage some cases draw distinctions based on the
form of the merger. See, e.g., Massachusetts cases cited in note 16 i,ifra. In general, though,
the different forms of merger have been, and should be, treated alike with regard to the issue of
this Note. Compare, e.g., Schlick v. Castle, 19 F.R. Serv. 2d 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (statutory
merger), with Platt Corp. v. Platt, 21 A.D. 2d 116, 249 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1964)1 a.ffd., 15 N.Y.2d
705, 204 N.E.2d 495, 256 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1965) (sale of assets). Both cases are discussed in notes
44-45 i,ifra and accompanying text.
7. Rights of action of the surviving corporation pose no special problem. After the merger,
the surviving corporation may pursue any claims it had before the merger. See 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 5, § 6.5(273).
8. Certain cases which do not readily fit any of the three approaches merit mention. In a
number of cases, the facts raised the issue which this Note treats, but the courts did not resolve
it. See Wall v. Parrot Silver & Copper Co., 244 U.S. 407 (1917); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing
Co., 489 F.2d 579, 591 n.12 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Polakoffv. Delaware
Steeplechase & Race Assn., 254 F. Supp. 574, 581 (D. Del. 1966); Kaminsky v. Abrams, 41
F.R.D. 168, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Another case, Albert v. Salzman, 41 A.D.2d SOI, 344
N.Y.S.2d 457, appeal denied, 33 N.Y.2d 520, 352 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1973), discusses these issues,
but the reasoning defies explanation.
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when an exception to the rule of passage is proper. 9
Section II examines the policies supporting the rule of passage
and proposes criteria for determining when an exception does not
offend those policies. It suggests that an exception is proper only
when the defendant is not at arm's length from either the merged
corporation's management or the surviving corporation. In such excepted cases, the merged corporation's former shareholders should
be entitled to sue derivatively and to seek pro rata recovery. 10
I.
A.

CONTOURS OF THE RULE OF PASSAGE

The Rule of Passage, Applied Strictly

The rule of passage, as applied by a majority of courts, can be
expressed as follows: After a merger, the merged corporation's rights
of action vest in the surviving corporation, "which may bring suit
thereon in its own name, and no right of action remains in the
[merged] corporation." 11 Courts have proposed three explanations
for the rule. One is that it merely applies the statutory principle that
assets of all kinds pass to the surviving corporation. 12 A second ex9. The Fifth Circuit termed the problem a "sticky one." Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co.,
489 F.2d 579, 591 n.12 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974). In 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE~ 23.1.16[1] n.17 (1978), Professor Moore called the question "very difficult." Professor Henn remarked that the issue "poses some still unresolved problems." H. HENN, HAND•
BOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS§ 361, at 764 (1970).
A competing view was advanced by Professor Jacobs in The Role ofthe Securities Exc/1a11ge
Act Rule JOb-5 in the Regulation of Corporate Management, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 27, 45-46
(1973): ''The question of the standing of the disappearing corporation is somewhat academic
because a class action by persons who were stockholders of the disappearing corporation at the
time of merger can fully redress any fraud perpetrated upon the corporate entity." Even if his
analysis is limited to the federal securities laws, Professor Jacobs is mistaken in asserting that
any fraud can be redressed by a class action. If the injury is to the corporation, and not to the
shareholders as individuals, only a derivative action is permitted. See note 5 supra. Further•
more, the derivative suit may have substantial advantages for the plaintiff over a class action,
See note 5 supra.
10. Damages recovered in derivative suits are normally paid to the corporate treasury. See
A. CONARD, supra note 6, § 249, at 395; Grenier, Prorata Recovery by Shareholders on Corporate Causes ofAction as a Means ofAchieving Corporate Justice, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 165,
165 (1962). A pro rata recovery, however, directly pays each stockholder a proportionate share
of what would have been a corporate recovery. See note 55 i'!fra.
11. 19 C.J.S. Corporations§ 1628, at 1390 (1940). Professor Bromberg associates the rule
that causes of action pass by merger with Delaware law. 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 5, § 6.5
(273)(1). See E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 366-67 (1972).
12. For example, in Niesz v. Gorsuch, 295 F.2d 909, 911-12 (9th Cir. 1961), the Ninth
Circuit construed the Arizona statute to mean that an action against the merged corporation's
directors would pass by merger to the surviving corporation. Accord, In re Penn Cent. Sec.
Litigation, 335 F. Supp. 1026, 1034 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Heit v. Tenneco, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 884,
887-88 (D. Del. 1970); Amstein v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 18 F. Supp. 916, 918 (E.D.N.Y.
1937); Braasch v. Goldschmidt, 41 Del. Ch. 519,530, 199 A.2d 760, 767 (Ct. Ch. 1964); Berger
v. General United Group, Inc., 268 N.W.2d 630, 638 (Iowa 1978).
For exemplary statutes, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 259(a) (Michie 1974); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW§ 906(b)(2) (McKinney 1963). ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT§ 76(d) (1953)
provides:
Such surviving or new corporation shall thereupon and thereafter possess all the rights,
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planation, offered by the Eighth Circuit, is that corporate causes of
action pass by common law as well as statute. 13 Finally, in several
cases involving sales of assets, 14 courts have held that passage of the
cause of action was a term of the sale agreement. 15 In one case, for
instance, the court held that where a sale agreement covered "all the
assets, property, plant and business" of the selling corporation, those
assets included a cause of action for waste of corporate property. 16
Whatever the authority for transferring the merged corporation's
cause of action - statute, common law, or agreement - applying
the rule of passage also denies the merged corporation's shareholders
standing to maintain a derivative suit. 17 Courts have given several
explanations for this result. Some have denied derivative standing
because the merged corporation, in whose name the shareholders
sue, no longer owns the cause of action. 18 For example, in Arnstein v.
privileges, immunities, and franchises, of a public as well as of a private nature, of each of
the merging or consolidating corporations; and all property, real, personal and mixed, and
all debts due on whatever account, including subscriptions to shares, and all other choses
in action, and all and every other interest of or belonging to or due to each of the corporations so merged or consolidated, shall be taken and deemed to oc transferred to and
vested in such single corporation without further act or deed; and the title to any real
estate, or any interest therein, vested in any of such corporations shall not revert or be in
any way impaired by reason of such merger or consoliclation.
13. See Sun Pipe Line Co. v. Altes, 511 F.2d 280, 283 (8th Cir. 1975); Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736, 741 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987
(1966). Since corporations are creatures of statute, the court's characterization of the rule of
passage as one of common law seems anomalous. The court was extending to corporations the
common law doctrine that tort claims vindicating property rights survive the death of the
injured person.
14. Since state merger statutes apply only to formal statutory mergers, the sales agreement
may control cases where the merger takes the form of a sale of assets. See generally note 6
supra.
15. See Meredith v. Art Metal Constr. Co., 97 Misc. 69, 161 N.Y.S. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1916), qffd
mem., 176 A.D. 945, 162 N.Y.S. 1131 (1917); McMenomy v. Ryden, 286 Minn. 358, 176
N.W.2d 876 (1970). See generally Note, 45 YALE L.J. 525 (1936).
16. Meredith v. Art Metal Constr. Co., 97 Misc. at 79-80, 161 N.Y.S. at 7. One may profitably compare a line of Massachusetts cases involving sales of assets. The Massachusetts
Supreme Court has held that because one may not assign a cause of action for fraud, such a
claim does not pass by a sale of all assets. See Baker v. Allen, 292 Mass. 169, 197 N.E. 521
(1935); American Woolen Co. v. Old Colony Trust Co., 263 Mass. 321, 160 N.E. 816 (1928);
United Zinc Cos. v. Harwood, 216 Mass. 474, 103 N.E. 1037 (1914). But cf. PPG Indus., Inc. v.
Guardian Indus. Corp., 428 F. Supp. 789 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (rule that personal patent licenses
are nonassignable does not apply in statutory merger).
For cases in which the merger agreement explicitly provided that the action would not
pass, see Platt Corp. v. Platt, 21 A.D.2d 116, 119,249 N.Y.S.2d 75, 78-79 (1964), qffd mem., 15
N.Y.2d 705, 205 N.E.2d 495, 256 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1965); Marco v. Sachs, 201 Misc. 934, 109
N.Y.S.2d 226 (Sup. Ct. 1951), qffd mem., 279 A.D. 1085, 113 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1952), qffd mem.,
304 N.Y. 912, 110 N.E.2d 737 (1953).
17. These shareholders would have standing if they carried over as shareholders of the
surviving corporation. See Gabhart v. Gabhart, 267 Ind. 370, 390-91, 370 N.E.2d 345, 357
(1977). But the suit would be on behalf of the surviving corporation, which, under the rule of
passage, would succeed to the merged corporation's cause of action.
18. See Niesz v. Gorsuch, 295 F.2d 909, 913 (9th Cir. 1961); Evmar Oil Corp. v. Getty Oil
Co., [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 96,358, at 93,234 (C.D. Cal.
1978); Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 79 F.R.D. 641, 647 (N.D. Tex. 1978); Basch v.
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Bethlehem Steel Corp., 19 the court reasoned:
Since whatever right of action the New Jersey corporation had
against its directors passed to the Delaware corporation, the New
Jersey corporation after the merger could not have instituted this action. Then it follows that if the corporation itself was barred because
its right of action was transferred to another corporation, the stockholders of the New Jersey corporation were without derivative status.20
Some courts have not even reached the question of who owns the
claim. They have denied derivative suits because the merged corporation - the ultimate plaintiff- no longer exists,21 leaving no corporation on whose behalf the shareholders can sue derivatively. 22 A
derivative action might also fail under the "continued ownership"
doctrine, which requires plaintiffs in derivative suits to own shares in
the coryoration throughout the litigation.23 Finally, courts have denied standing on the theory that dissenters' rights statutes24 provide
the exclusive remedy for aggrieved shareholders.25 Thusr strict apTalley Indus., Inc., 53 F.R.D. 9, 11-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Heit v. Tenneco, Inc., 319 F. Supp.
884, 887-88 (D. Del. 1970); Daugherty v. Ball, 43 F.R.D. 329, 334 (C.D. Cal. 1967); Braasch v.
Goldschmidt, 41 Del. Ch. 519, 530, 199 A.2d 760, 767 (Ct. Ch. 1964); Berger v. General United
Group, Inc., 268 N.W.2d 630, 638-39 (Iowa 1978). C.f. Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 587 F.2d
866, 871-72 (7th Cir. 1978) (claims against the survivor pass); Bokat v. Getty Oil Co., 262 A.2d
246, 249 (Del. 1970) (claims against the survivor pass).
19. 18 F. Supp. 916 (E.D.N.Y. 1937).
20. 18 F. Supp. at 918.
21. See Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 637 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970
(1967) (referring to the "meaninglessness" of a derivative suit on behalf of a merged corporation); Kamerman v. Pakco Cos., Civ. No. 76-3912 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 1978), '!ffd. mem., 603
F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1979); Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849, 855-56 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); '!ffd., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), revd. on other grounds, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Katz v.
Aspinwall, 342 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. Ala. 1971), '!ffd. per curiam, 459 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972) (a corporation dissolved after a sale of all its assets is legally
dead); E. FOLK, supra note 11, at 366-67.
22. State statutes often provide for continued existence of a corporation while it winds up
its affairs. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1107 (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 261
(Michie 1974); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 105 (1953). But some courts have held
such statutes inapplicable where the action may pass by merger. See Niesz v. Gorsuch, 295
F.2d 909, 912-13 (9th Cir. 1961). C.f. Amstein v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 18 F. Supp. 916, 918
(E.D.N.Y. 1937) (predecessor of continued-corporate-existence statute). But see text at notes
32-36 i'!fi-a.
23. Shareholders may lose their shares in two ways: by surrendering their shares, see
Voege v. Ackermann, 364 F. Supp. 72, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Independent Investor Protective
League v. Time, Inc., 66 A.D.2d 391, 393, 412 N.Y.S.2d 898, 899 (1979), or by electing appraisal, see Johnson v. Baldwin, 221 S.C. 141, 69 S.E.2d 585 (1952). See generally 1A C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL§ 1826 (1972).
24. ·See note 108 i'!fi-a and accompanying text.
25. See generally Vorenberg, Exclusiveness ofthe JJissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Rig/11,
77 HARV. L. REv. 1189 (1964). This argument is inapplicable, however, when the claim is
based on the federal securities law. See, e.g., Merrit v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 533 F.2d
1310, 1313-14 (2d Cir. 1976); Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 435 F.2d 1121, 1124 n,3
(2d Cir. 1970); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 635-36, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970
(1967); 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 5, § 6.5(272)(1); note 40 i'!fi-a. "The rights and remedies
provided by" the federal securities law are "in addition to any and all other rights and reme-
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plication of the rule of passage precludes both primary and derivative actions in the merged corporation's name.
Nor can the surviving corporation be certain of its ability to bring
an action that has passed from the merged corporation. As a primary suit, the surviving corporation may pursue the action26 unless
it is itself the defendant.27 For derivative suits, one might suppose
that, since the surviving corporation can bring a primary action, the
surviving corporation's shareholders could bring a derivative action.
But the contemporaneous-ownership rule (not to be confused with
the continued-ownership rule28) requires that derivative shareholder
plaintiffs have been shareholders when the wrong occurred.29
Notwithstanding occasional contrary dicta,30 that rule limits standdies that may exist at law or in equity." Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 77p
(1976); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 23(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976).
26. See Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966); In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 335 F. Supp. 1026, 1034
(E.D. Pa. 1971); Storer Broadcasting Co. v. Jack the Bellboy, Irie., 107 F. Supp. 988 (E.D.
Mich. 1952); Bank of United States v. Glickman, 241 A.D. 92,271 N.Y.S. 90, a.ffd. per curiam,
265 N.Y. 539, 193 N.E. 309 (1934). However, the contemporaneous ownership and vicarious
incapacity rules arguably present a barrier in some cases. See text at notes 73-77 1i?fra.
27. Evmar Oil Corp. v. Getty Oil Co., [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) ~ 96,358, at 93,235 (C.D. Cal. 1978); Bokat v. Getty Oil Co., 262 A.2d 246, 249 (Del.
1970); Braasch v. Goldschmidt, 41 Del. Ch. 519, 530, 199 A.2d 760, 767 (Ct. Ch. 1964). These
courts followed the obvious reasoning that a corporation may not sue itself.
28. One must be careful to distinguish "continued ownership" from "contemporaneous
ownership." The former requires that one be a shareholder at the co=encement and through
the duration of the lawsuit; the latter requires that one have been a shareholder when the
transaction challenged by the complaint occurred. See Schilling v. Belcher, 582 F.2d 995, 999
(5th Cir. 1978); text at note 23 supra.
29. At the federal level, this requirement is embodied in FED. R. C1v. P. 23.l, which provides, in part: "In a derivative action . . . , the complaint . . . shall allege (1) that the plaintiff
was a shareholder . . . at the time of the transaction of which he complains or that his shares
.•• thereafter devolved on him by operation oflaw . . . ." This rule originated in Hawes v.
City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1882). It was codified in Equity Rule 94, 104 U.S. ix (1882),
and later in Equity Rule 27,226 U.S. app. at 8 (1912). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
at their inception, adopted it in rule 23(b). Rule 23(b) was reformulated in 1966 as rule 23.1,
and the drafters retained the contemporaneous-ownership requirement. See 3B MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 23.1.15[1] (1978).
Most states also follow the requirement. See id. ~ 23.1.15[2] n.6; Harbrecht, The Contemporaneous Ownership Rule in Shareholders' .Derivative Suits, 25 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1043 (1978).
Some courts have reduced the impact of the requirement, however, by applying a "continuing
wrong" theory. See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 23, § 1828, at 346-48; Harbrecht,
supra at 1052-56.
30. Niesz v. Gorsuch, 295 F.2d 909,913 (9th Cir. 1961); Arnstein v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
18 F. Supp. 916, 918 (E.D.N.Y. 1937); Meredith v. Art Metal Constr. Co., 97 Misc. 69, 80, 161
N.Y.S. I, 7 (Sup. Ct. 1916), a.ffd., 176 A.D. 945, 162 N.Y.S. 1131 (1917).
A possible loophole in the rule, not articulated in these cases, is to prove that the shares
devolved on the plaintiff "by operation of law." FED. R C1v. P. 23.1. See note 29 supra.
Wright and Miller argue that this language covers "any nonconsensual transaction by which
plaintiff acquired the stock." 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 23, § 1828, at 348.
Even a transfer with "some element of bargain or consent" has been held to qualify under this
standard if it sufficiently approximates a devolution by operation oflaw. Hirshfield v. Briskin,
447 F.2d 694 (7th Cir. 1971). Cf. Helfand v. Gambee, 37 Del. Ch. 51, 136 A.2d 558 (Ct. Ch.
1957) (where the plaintiff acquired shares in a new corporation pursuant to an antitrust consent decree which she ratified, she acquired them ''by operation oflaw"; the Delaware rule was
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ing to carryover shareholders of the surviving corporation: those
who also held shares in the merged corporation when the challenged
transaction occurred. 31
The Rule of Passage, with Exceptions

B.

Many courts have found the destruction of opportunities to
maintain derivative suits unduly harsh. Sensing possible inequities
in giving corporate managers the power to destroy the derivative
claims of minority shareholders, they have sought ways around the
rule of passage. Some have found justifications for giving shareholders of merged corporations continued standing to maintain derivative suits. One has given those shareholders a new, direct action.
But rare indeed is the case that offers standards for determining
when an exception to the rule of passage is appropriate.
1.

Cases Preserving .Derivative Suits

Cases allowing shareholders of merged corporations to maintain
derivative suits have offered three sources of authority: state statutes
allowing continued corporate existence after a merger, the federal
securities laws, and general powers of equity. The different techniques merit brief comparison.
If a corporation is a party to litigation when it is merged out
of existence, substituting the surviving corporation might disrupt
the litigation. Thus, most states have statutes permitting litigation
to continue in the name of the merged party. 32 Several courts
have used these statutes to allow shareholders' suits to continue
substantially identical to the federal rule). Nevertheless it seems that the "operation of law"
language is designed principally for inheritances, not for mergers. Compare Phillips v. Bradford, 62 F.R.D. 681, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), with Emporium Capwell Co. v. Anglim, 140 F.2d
224, 226 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 752 (1944) (transfer of stock in merger was not "by
operation of law" for tax purposes). See generally Harbrecht, supra note 29, at 1057-60.
31. Carryover shareholders have even been permitted to pursue an action pending before
the merger. For example, one Ninth Circuit case refused to allow a derivative action that
shareholders had initiated before a merger, Niesz v. Gorsuch, 295 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1961), but
a later opinion in the same case permitted shareholders of the surviving corporation to inter•
vene as parties-plaintiff in the action. DePinto v. Provident Sec. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826,
832 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 950 (1964). The court used the principle of relation
back to avoid operation of the statute of limitations. See generally Albert v. Salzman, 41
A.D.2d 501, 504, 344 N.Y.S.2d 457, 461, appeal denied, 33 N.Y.2d 520, 352 N.Y.S.2d 1025
(1973) (intervention permissible in an action that had been dismissed); Platt Corp. v. Platt, 21
A.D.2d 116, 121, 249 N.Y.S.2d 75, 80 (1964), '!ifd., 15 N.Y.2d 705, 204 N.E.2d 495, 256
N.Y.S.2d 335 (1965) (upon merger, substitution of new parties is permissible). See also Malcolm v. Cities Serv. Co., 2 F.R.D. 405,407 (D. Del. 1942) (where plaintiff-representative in a
class action sold her stock, other shareholders were entitled to notice before dismissal and to
relation back to meet the statute of limitations); Richman v. Felmus, 8 A.D.2d 985, 190
N.Y.S.2d 920 (1959) (intervention allowed in a derivative suit only for those shareholders with
contemporaneous ownership).
32. See note 22 supra.
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after the merger. 33 For example, in Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp. ,34 a derivative action was pending when the corporation
merged with another. The court relied on former California General
Corporation Law§ 4116, typical of these statutes, which provided:
Any action or proceeding pending by or against any constituent corporation may be prosecuted to judgment, which shall bind the consolidated or the surviving corporation, or the consolidated or surviving
corporation may be proceeded against or substituted in its place.35

Emphasizing that the survivor "may" be substituted, the court ruled
that the pending cause of action need not abate or pass.36 The
Abrams exception to the rule of passage is quite narrow: it excepts
only actions commenced before the merger. Moreover, some courts
have further limited this exception to claims not against the surviving corporation. 37
Broader exceptions to the rule of passage are found in cases that
rely on either the securities laws or general powers of equity. In
Miller v. Steinbach, 38 an example of the cases resting on federal securities law, 39 the plaintiff had been a shareholder of the merged corporation. He sued that corporation's officers and directors for
numerous violations of the federal securities laws. Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 17(b) provides that the law of the state of incorporation determines a corporation's capacity to sue in federal court; 40 yet
the court held that "where an action is based on the federal securities
33. See Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 587 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1978); J.C. Peacock, Inc. v.
Hasko, 184 Cal. App. 2d 142, 151, 7 Cal. Rptr. 490,495 (1960); Platt Corp. v. Platt, 21 A.D.2d
I 16, 121, 249 N.Y.S.2d 75, 80 (1964), qffd., 15 N.Y.2d 705, 204 N.E.2d 495, 256 N.Y.S.2d 335
(1965). q. Bokat v. Getty Oil Co., 262 A.2d 246, 250 (Del. 1970) (suggesting that the suit
would have been allowed but for the statute of limitations).
34. 20 F.R. Serv. 2d 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
35. CAL. CORP. CODE § 4116 (West 1955), amended and recod!fted, CAL. CORP. CODE
§ l 107 (West 1977). The court also quoted DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 261 (Michie 1974), which
is to the same effect.
36. 20 F.R. Serv. 2d at 173. Strangely enough, the Abrams court did not indicate who
would receive the recovery.
37. See Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 587 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1978); Bokat v. Getty Oil
Co., 262 A.2d 246 (Del. 1970).
38. 268 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
39. Accord, DeHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 300 F. Supp. 834 (D. Colo. 1969), mod!fted,
435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970); Continental Tel. Corp. v. Lycoming Tel. Corp., [1967-1969
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ,J 92,193 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
40. ''The capacity of a corporation to sue or be sued shall be determined by the Jaw under
which it was organized." FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b). A number of courts have, pursuant to this
rule, used state Jaw in securities cases. See Evmar Oil Corp. v. Getty Oil Co., [1978-1979
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ,J 96,358, at 93,234 (C.D. Cal. 1978); Schlick v.
Castle, 19 F.R. Serv. 2d 642, 643-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Basch v. Talley Indus., Inc., 53 F.R.D. 9,
Il (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Rosenfeld v. Schwitzer Corp., 251 F. Supp. 758, 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). q.
Kamerman v. Pakco Cos., Civ. No. 76-3912 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 1978) (not mentioning rule
17(b)), qffd. mem., 603 F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1979). But see Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722,
726-27 (2d Cir. 1971) (state definition ofa "shareholder" does not control for purposes of rule
!Ob-5); Orenstein v. Compusamp, Inc., 19 F.R. Serv. 2d 466, 467-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). But c.f.
Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 1965), cert.
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laws, state substantive or procedural laws may not impede the application of the federal statute."41 Consequently, the court disregarded
the rule of passage, allowed the suit to proceed, and endorsed a pro
rata recovery42 for the shareholders of the merged corporation.43
Other courts have used their equitable powers to create exceptions to the rule of passage. For example, the plaintiffs in Schlick v.
Castle,44 former shareholders of the merged corporation, sued its
denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966) ("federal and general co=on law" controls). See generally Recent Decision, 21 J. Pua. L. 487 (1972).
The federal courts need not abide by state rules of standing or capacity in applying a
federal statute. In J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964), the Court stated that in
administering the federal securities laws, the courts have a duty to "be alert to provide such
remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose." Since federal law is
supreme, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, such remedies need not conform to state law. See Santa
Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (1977) ("[t]he existence of a particular stale law
remedy is not dispositive of the question whether Congress meant to provide a similar federal
remedy . . . ."); note 25 supra. Cf. Evmar Oil Corp. v. Getty Oil Co., (1978-1979 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) f 96,358, at 93,234 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (derivative antitrust
claim under federal law).
Recently, however, the Supreme Court has become inclined to read the scope of the securities laws more narrowly. At one point in the development of federal securities jurisprudence,
it seemed that the broad scope of those laws would obviate the need for significant reliance on
the not-as-liberally-applied state-law theories. Professor Loss observed in 1969 that "the implication of a private action under Rule lOb-5 has already displaced and federalized a great
deal of state law, not only in the area of deceit but also with respect to the duties of officers and
directors to the corporation and its stockholders." 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3870
(2d ed. Supp. 1969).
It is now clear that those laws will not displace the state law of fiduciary obligation. In
denying a claim that a squeeze-out merger violated rule I0b-5, the Supreme Court held that
the rule does not amount to a "federal fiduciary principle." Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430
U.S. 462, 479 (1977). The Santo Fe ruling will force some plaintiffs who might formerly have
brought federal-securities-law actions to seek redress under state law. Cf. Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (state remedies are considered in deciding whether to imply a private right
of action under a federal statute).
41. 268 F. Supp. at 268. Cf. Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722, 729 (2d Cir. 1971) (slate
definition of a "shareholder" does not control for purposes of a derivative action under § IO(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act); Orenstein v. Compusamp, Inc., 19 F.R. Serv. 2d 466, 467-68
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (federal law, and not state law, controls standing to bring a derivative suit
under the federal securities laws).
42. See note 55 infra.
43. 268 F. Supp. at 268. The securities laws can also lead to the denial of derivative standing. Several courts saw no need to protect derivative rights since they found that a class action
under the federal securities laws would, in those cases, provide adequate protection. See Vine
v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967); Voege v. Ackerman, 364 F. Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Basch v. Talley Indus., Inc., 53 F.R.D. 9 (S.D.N.Y.
1971). Cf. Independent Investor Protective League v. Time, Inc., 66 A.D.2d 391,412 N.Y.S.2d
898 (1979) (denying a direct state-law right of action for former shareholders of a merged
corporation).
44. 19 F.R. Serv. 2d 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). In Platt Corp. v. Platt, 21 A.D.2d 116, 249
N.Y.S.2d 75 (1964), qffd, 15 N.Y.2d 705, 204 N.E.2d 495, 256 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1965), the court
refused to apply the rule of passage, observing:
Policy and equitable considerations weigh heavily in favor of rather than against the conclusion that the causes of action against the defendants did not become obliterated by the
merger of the wronged corporation into another corporation. To hold that a merier
would have the effect of destroyin~ such causes of action would be tantamount to pavmg
the way for deliberate corporate pilfering by management and then for the i=umzation
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former directors and the surviving corporation, asserting violations
of federal securities laws and state fiduciary obligations. Judge
Frankel refused to apply the rule of passage to deny the merged corporation's shareholders the opportunity to sue: "It seems incongruous and inequitable that former directors and the surviving corporation should be immune from suit for fraud in a merger because the
merged corporation in technical terms no longer exists, when the
fraud under attack was the very means by which the merged corporation's existence was ended."45
2. A Case Creating a .Direct Shareholder Action
In general, when a corporation has suffered injury, shareholders
lack standing to sue directly, either as individuals or as a class. They
must sue derivatively on behalf of the corporation.46 In Kirk v. First
National Bank,41 a federal district court departed from that rule and
allowed former shareholders of a merged corporation to sue directly
on corporate claims. The shareholders of Wright Contracting Company had sold their shares in response to a tende1 offer by the Hardaway Company. Subsequently, the former Wright shareholders
discovered that their ex-president had violated his fiduciary duties.
The plaintiffs conceded they lacked standing to sue derivatively
on the corporate claim against the ex-president, and sued directly
instead. The court recognized that the claim belonged to the corporation and therefore that the shareholders could normally bring it
only derivatively. Nevertheless, the court allowed a direct suit beof the guilty officers from liability thereby by their arranging for a merger or consolidation of the corporation into or with another corporation.
21 A.D.2d at 124, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 83. The holding may be explained on other grounds, however. The merger agreement in Platt contained a clause preserving the right of the plaintiffs to
bring a derivative suit after consummation of the merger. But see Duffy v. Cross Country
Indus., Inc., 57 A.D.2d 1063, 1063, 395 N.Y.S.2d 852, 853 (1977), which cites Platt for the
proposition that a corporation's action against its officers for self-dealing survives a merger.
Similar to Platt is Marco v. Sachs, 201 Misc. 934, 109 N.Y.S.2d 226 (Sup. Ct. 1951), qffd, 279
A.O. 1085, 113 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1952), qffd, 304 N.Y. 912, 110 N.E.2d 737 (1953). The court
allowed a suit in the name of the merged corporation and justified this result by the maxim
that "Equity looks to substance." One can readily explain the holding, however, by observing
that the cause of action had been segregated from the corporate assets and assigned to the
plaintiffs. But cf. Niesz v. Gorsuch, 295 F.2d 909, 913 (9th Cir. 1961) (following the rule of
passage despite a clause in the merger agreement that could have been construed otherwise).
45. 19 F.R. Serv. 2d at 644. See Miller v. Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255, 267 (S.D.N.Y.
1967). But cf. Kamerman v. Pakco Cos., Civ. No. 76-3912 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 1978) (holding
that where the merger is not under attack, the "equitable considerations" do not appear), qffd
mem., 603 F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1979); Evmar Oil Corp. v. Getty Oil Co., (1978-1979 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) f 96,358, at 93,234 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (since the claim is not
connected with the merger, equitable considerations do not save the claim).
Judge Frankel suggested that the plaintiffs receive a pro rata recovery. 19 F.R. Serv. 2d at
645. See note 55 inji-a.
46. See note 5 supra.
47. 439 F. Supp. 1141 (M.D. Ga. 1977).
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cause it found that none of the dangers motivating the requirement
of a derivative claim were present.48 According to the court, the
dangers of allowing a direct action are: (1) recovery by a party not
actually injured; (2) multiple lawsuits; and (3) prejudice to creditors
and unrepresented shareholders. The court first noted that the plaintiffs had actually been harmed: because of the undiscovered breach
of fiduciary duty, they had not received fair value for their shares.
Second, no additional lawsuits were possible since all shareholders
of the Hardaway Company, the surviving corporation, lacked contemporaneous ownership.49 Finally, the court determined that an individual suit would not seriously prejudice corporation creditors or
unrepresented former shareholders.so
By allowing a direct suit on a corporate claim, Kirk dramatically
departs from traditional corporate principles. Even the cases relying
solely on equitable powers to circumvent the rule of passage have
heeded the distinction between direct and derivative actions. Kirk
thus highlights both the frustration courts have felt with the rule of
passage and their need for a theory that harmonizes the rule's equitable exceptions with the related doctrines of corporate law.st
3.

Gabhart and the Quest for Standards

While each of these justifications for evading the rule of passage
has allowed courts to achieve intuitively attractive results, none by
its logic offers a principled explanation of when the exception should
or should not apply.s 2 Criteria are needed for determining when an
48. 439 F. Supp. at 1149.
49. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
50. The court reasoned that no prejudice to the creditors would result because the corporation would not have been able to recover regardless of this suit. As to other former shareholders, the court argued that any prejudice would be no more serious than that in a typical class
action.
51. Independent Investor Protective League v. Time, Inc., 66 A.D.2d 391, 412 N.Y.S.2d
898 (1979), also merits mention. The court allowed the merged corporation's former shareholders to initiate a direct action to redress mismanagement that had occurred before the
merger. The mismanagement claim - unlawful depression of stock value by the directors should have been deemed derivative, but unlike Kirk, this court did not describe the claim as
derivative.
One inexplicable case allowing an individual claim is Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298
F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), mod!fied, 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973). The court argued that
"when a corporation becomes non-existent" because of a merger, "the corporate right to sue
devolves upon the shareholders" of the defunct corporation. 298 F. Supp. at 102. The court
cited Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967), and
Bacon v. Robertson, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 480 (1856), but both are readily distinguishable: In
Vine, the court allowed a class action since only the Class A shareholders had been injured,
and Bacon involved not a merger but a dissolution. A true dissolution (as opposed to, e.g., a
sale of all assets followed by a dissolution in order to effectuate a merger, see note 6 supra)
requires an altogether different analysis. In a dissolution, the enterprise comes to an end.
There is no "surviving" enterprise to which the right to sue could pass. Since the authority
that it cites is not supportive, the statement by the Gerstle court is of dubious validity.
52. Two recent cases have acknowledged the need for equitable exceptions without sug-
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exception is proper. The Indiana Supreme Court recently addressed
this problem in Gabhart v. Gabhart. 53 The court acknowledged that
the rule of passage generally controls, but relied on equitable considerations to carve out an exception:
[A] Court of Equity may grant relief, pro rata, to a former shareholder,
of a merged corporation, whose equity was adversely affected by the
fraudulent act of an officer or director and whose means of redress
otherwise would be cut off by the merger, if there is no shareholder of
the surviving corporation eligible to maintain a derivative action for
such wrong and said shareholder had no prior opportunity for redress
by derivative action against either the merged or the surviving corporation.54

Gabhart properly recommended pro rata recovery55 for plaintiffs
gesting a general standard for finding such exceptions. See Kamerman v. Pakco Cos., Civ. No.
76-3912 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 1978), ajfd mem., 603 F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1979); Evmar Oil Corp. v.
Getty Oil Co., [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 96,358, at 93,234 (C.D.
Cal. 1978).
53. 267 Ind. 370, 370 N.E.2d 345 (1977). The Seventh Circuit, required to apply Indiana
law, had asked the Indiana court for advice.
54. 267 Ind. at 392, 370 N.E.2d at 358.
55. The pro rata device allows the shareholders to receive directly their proportionate
share of what would otherwise be a corporate recovery. The leading case that used the device
is Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955). See
generally Grenier, supra note 10; Note, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1314 (1956).
Since the merged corporation no longer has a treasury, see note 12 supra and accompanying text, a pro rata recovery is the only damage remedy available in a derivative suit on behalf
of a merged corporation. Therefore, several cases, like Gabhart, have endorsed the pro rata
concept in these situations. See Schlick v. Castle, 19 F.R. Serv. 2d 642, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
Miller v. Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Schur v. Salzman, 50 A.D.2d 784,
784-85, 377 N.Y.S.2d 82, 84 (1975) (memorandum), appeal dismissed, 38 N.Y.2d 1007, 348
N.E.2d 919, 384 N.Y.S.2d 442 (1976).
Often, recovery is limited to those shareholders who did not participate in the wrongdoing
as an application of the well-established principle of equity: "He who comes into equity must
come with clean hands." 2 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 397 (S.
Symons ed. 1941). Courts have occasionally used the pro rata device in other contexts to
effectuate this principle. See Note, supra, at 1316. But see Guerrino v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 423
F.2d 419,422 (3d Cir. 1970); Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch. 234, 253, 2 A.2d 904, 912-13
(Sup. Ct. 1938).
Mere consent to the merger, unlike participation in the wrongdoing, should not bar recovery. The right of action vests in the merged corporation's shareholders because the purchase
price does not reflect the fair value of the claim. Since those who consent to the merger do not
receive a premium, their rights should not be subordinate to those_pf the dissenting shareholders, who are permitted to sue. q: text at notes 108-16 infra (explaining why the opportunity
for dissent should not limit the right to sue).
A difficult question is whether shareholders lacking contemporaneous ownership should be
able to share in the recovery. The best discussion of this issue is Grenier, supra note 10, at 17586.
When former shareholders of merged corporations sue derivatively, it would be logical to
excuse some of the procedural requirements normally associated with derivative suits. For
example, many jurisdictions require the plaintiff to make a demand for action:
The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff
to obtain the action he desires from the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders or members, and the reasons for his failure to obtain the
act10n or for not making the effort.
FED. R. C1v. P. 23.l. This requirement should be waived.
The requirement that the plaintiff serve process on the merged corporation to join it as an
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falling within the exception, but it defined the exception too narrowly. Principally concerned with the derivative suit's deterrent
function, 5~ the court wanted only to guarantee that some party
would be eligible to bring suit. Accordingly, the exception applies
only when no shareholder of the surviving corporation can maintain
the suit derivatively on behalf of the survivor and no shareholder of
the merged corporation had a prior opportunity to bring the claim. 57
Yet a derivative suit is more than a deterrent. It also compensates
wronged shareholders. The next Section develops standards for exceptions to the rule of passage that reflect both the compensatory and
deterrent functions of derivative suits.
II.

CRITERIA FOR EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE OF PASSAGE

The courts have failed to develop adequate standards for deciding the scope of the rule of passage. Indeed, some courts have not
even considered that exceptions inay be proper, but instead have applied the rule of passage mechanically, denying standing to the
merged corporation's shareholders.58 Those courts may have overlooked the importance of the derivative actions they were thwarting.
Derivative suits, a minority shareholder's principal defense against
majority abuses, 59 serve two important policies. First, they compensate the corporation for wrongs suffered,60 giving redress that may be
an important asset of the corporation.61 Second, they deter misconduct by the corporate management, such as violations of fiduciary
indispensable party, see, e.g., Tryforos v. Icarian Dev. Co., 518 F.2d 1258, 1264 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1091 (1976), should also be excused. Since the federal courts are to
apply the indispensable party rule in "equity and good conscience," FED. R. C1v. P. 19(b),
strict adherence to the joinder and service requirements is not necessary. See Weinert v. Kinkel, 296 N.Y. 151, 71 N.E.2d 445 (1947). But see Beals v. Washington Intl., Inc., 386 A.2d 1156
(Del. Ch. 1978) (denying service of process on a merged corporation).
56. The court expressed "concern . . . that when the cause of action is against directors or
majority shareholders, the wrongdoers may insulate themselves from liability by means of a
merger." 267 Ind. at 390,370 N.E.2d at 357. The court did not mention protection of minority
shareholders' investments as a basis for its exception.
57. The court based its reasoning on the vicarious incapacity principle, which provides that
a corporation may not sue on a claim if none of its shareholders are eligible to pursue that
claim derivatively. See text at note 74 i,!fra. Thus, the court assumed that if none of the
surviving corporation's shareholders had contemporaneous ownership, the survivor itself
would be ineligible to sue. But see text at note 77 i,!fra.
58. See, e.g., Niesz v. Gorsuch, 295 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1961).
59. 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 5940 (rev. vol. 1970).
60. Derivative suits are sometimes misused by shareholders who bring specious actions in
the hope of obtaining a quick and lucrative settlement from the corporate treasury. Such
"strike suits" naturally harm, rather than compensate, the corporation. See Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739-43 (1975); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541,548 (1949); F. Wooo, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVA•
TIVE Surrs (1944).
61. Meyer v. Fleming, 327 U.S. 161, 167 (1946).
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duty. 62
Courts should not apply the rule of passage in disregard of those
policies. Derivative suits are creations of equity.63 and equitable
principles should dictate exceptions to the rule of passage when necessary to achieve an equitable result. Unfortunately, the equitable
result is often hard to ascertain. Standards are needed if judges are
to reach consistent results and if those affected are to be able to predict the legal outcome. This Section proposes such standards for exceptions to the rule of passage. The proposed standards examine the
relationship between the prospective defendant and those managing
the merging corporations.64 For claims against parties at arm's
length from either corporation's management, courts should apply
the rule of passage. However, if the potential defendant is closely
associated with the management of both corporations, the action
should not pass, and the merged corporation's shareholders should
be permitted to pursue the defendant derivatively.
A.

Claims Against Parties at Arm's Length from the Merged
Corporation's Management

The principal justification for the rule of passage is that it enforces the intent of the merging corporations. They have presumably
agreed to pass the action and have ordered their risks and prices
accordingly.65 One can fairly assume that the parties to a merger
intend all assets of the merged corporation that are not explicitly
62. Brendle v. Smith, 46 F. Supp. 522, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Rostow, To 'Whom and For
'What Ends is Corporate Management Responsible?, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN Soc1E1Y 48 (E. Mason ed. 1959). Fiduciary breaches and unauthorized actions can often be remedied through derivative suits. In Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L.
Rev. 74, 77-78 (1967), Professor Dykstra listed "instances in which shareholders successfully
challenged or stated good causes of action." These were actions
for excessive salaries, the issuance of stock for no or insufficient consideration, diversion
of corporate business opportunity, misapplication of funds, secret profits, excessive stock
options, violations of contractual arrangements, improper individual claims as opposed to
corporate claims for surrender [sic] shares, the unlawful purchase by a corporation of its
own securities, illegal payment for shares in another corporation, sale of control, improvident loans and the abuse of a subsidiary by the parent.
Id Shareholders may also bring derivative suits under the federal securities laws. See 13 W.
FLETCHER, supra note I, § 5923.2 (rev. vol. 1970).
In some cases, though, indemnity agreements or insurance may undercut the deterrent
function of derivative suits. See generally w. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS
& DIRECTORS§§ 16-17 (1969); G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, INDEMNIFYING THE CORPORATE
EXECUTIVE (1963).
63. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
\
64. This Note will use the term "management" to describe those persons who control the
merged corporation. Officers, directors, and principal shareholders are prime candidates for
the management. However, a director who has a conflict of interest will not always infect the
corporation's decisionmaking. See., e.g., Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979). Control would
be a factual issue in each case.
65. Courts have found several sources oflegal authority for the rule. See text at notes 1116 supra. This Section discusses equitable concerns that determine when the rule should apply.
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excepted to pass to the survivor.66 Thus, the parties would negotiate
over a cause of action like any other asset during price negotiations.67 They would similarly bargain for undiscovered causes of action, realizing that latent assets and liabilities may surface after the
merger. Absent an agreement to the contrary, the surviving corporation bases its purchase price on an assumption that it can sue on
later-discovered causes of action. Similarly, in accepting the offer,
the merged corporation assumes the risk of losing valuable causes of
action.68 In this risk allocation, the merged corporation surrenders
its rights of action to the survivor whether or not such rights are
apparent at the time of merger.69
That justification for the rule of passage supports the rule's consistent application - and the corresponding impairment of derivative standing - when a claim's potential defendant is at arm's length
from the merged corporation's management.70 In such a case, the
66. In effect, the surviving corporation purchases the assets of the merged corporation in
any type of merger, since it surrenders cash, stock, or other property to the merged corporation
or its shareholders. See generally note 6 supra. If the parties do not intend that all assets pass,
they may except an asset, such as a cause of action, from the passage. See note 44 supra.
67. Indeed, some causes of action are so integrally connected with other assets that it
would be senseless to distinguish them. For example, when the surviving corportion bargains
to acquire accounts receivable, it is likewise bargaining for the right to enforce those receivables in litigation.
68. Some co=entators attack the bargain justification as fictional. See Rosenfeld v.
Black, 336 F. Supp. 84, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV, L. REV.
13,235 n.51. They do so because the notion that the survivor can bargain for latent causes of
action troubles them. Their objection is answered, though, by viewing the bargain as a risk
allocation.
69. A second, though less significant, justification for the rule of passage is that it may be
more efficient to charge a going concern with prosecuting a lawsuit than to prolong the corpo•
ration's life for purposes of litigation. The active management of the survivor can probably
better make the necessary discretionary decisions during the litigation.
Other justifications for the rule are less forceful. Some have argued that it would be difficult to locate former shareholders of a publicly held corporation so as to allow them to recover.
But with computerized records, this obstacle is insignificant. See Rosenfeld v. Black, 336 F.
Supp. 84, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, supra note 68, at 235 n.51.
Another argument for passage is that since the plaintiff-corporation no longer exists, it may not
sue, and, thus, the action should pass to a party able to do so. Such an argument was rejected
in Marco v. Sachs, 201 Misc. 934, 936-37, 109 N.Y.S.2d 226, 228-29 (Sup. Ct. 1951), qffd., 279
A.D. 1085, 113 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1952), qffd., 304 N.Y. 912, 110 N.E.2d 737 (1953), based on a
continued-corporate-existence statute. See note 22 supra. But even if such a statute does not
apply, the argument is weak for its rigid formalism. In light of the possibility of pro rata
recovery, see note 55 supra, the practical barriers to allowing a suit by a defunct corporation
can be surmounted.
70. Arm's-length status would need to be judged on the facts of each case. The term
"arm's length" has no magical significance here; the essential inquiry is whether the merged
corporation's management has a personal or financial interest in seeing the litigation resolved
in favor of the defendant. Alternatively phrased, one might ask whether the management
exercises independent judgment regarding the merits of the suit and acts on that judgment.
The problem of defining arm's-length relationships arises in various other legal settings,
For examples of how Congress has handled it, see I.R.C. § 267 (disallowance of losses, etc.
between related taxpayers); 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(25) (West Supp. 1979) (definition of"insider" in
Bankruptcy Act). Cf. note 89 i'!fra (arm's-length concept used in defining "complete fairness").
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directors of the merged corporation should adequately represent the
corporation's interest in the claim. Free from any conflicting motive,
the management will exact fair consideration from the survivor for
conveying the action, thus reimbursing the corporation's shareholders for their loss.
For example, suppose Mr. Welsh has sold defective equipment,
under warranty, to M Corporation. Suppose further that the directors of S Corporation and M Corporation negotiate a merger: Swill
survive and M's shareholders will receive $100 for each share of M.
If M's directors are at arm's length from Welsh, then, upon completion of the merger, the right to bring an action for breach of warranty should pass from M to S. This result is fair, because in paying
M's shareholders for their stock, S purchases and M sells the right
to sue Mr. Welsh, just as S purchases and M sells the other assets of
M. On these facts, the rule of passage sensibly presumes that the
$100 per share sufficiently compensates M's shareholders for losing
this right of action, since the disinterested business judgment of M's
directors is presumptively valid.71
Although this analysis establishes the general desirability of the
rule of passage when the merged corporation's management is at
arm's length from the defendant, two specific situations deserve further attention. The first arises when the surviving corporation is the
defendant. If the cause of action passes in that case, the surviving
corporation will be unwilling and, indeed, unable to pursue it: a corporation may not sue itself.72 The survivor's only motive for paying
fair value for the claim would be to settle it. If the parties are at
arm's length it makes good sense to assume that they do in fact negotiate a settlement.
A second special problem arises in some mergers due to the
vicarious incapacity principle, which states that a corporation may
not sue if none of its shareholders is eligible to bring a derivative
suit. The principle originated in Home Fire Insurance Co. v. Barber,73 where Dean Roscoe Pound, then a commissioner of the Nebraska Supreme Court, argued that if the stockholders "have no
standing in equity to entitle them to the relief sought for their benefit, they cannot obtain such relief through the corporation or in its
own name. . . . It would be a reproach to the courts of equity if this
71. "[T]he law will not hold directors liable for honest errors, for mistakes of judgment,
when they act without corrupt motive and in good faith . . . . And that is true even though the
errors may be so gross that they demonstrate the unfitness of the directors to manage the
corporate affairs." 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 1039, at 37-38 (rev. vol. 1975). See Chelf
v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 505-07, 199 A.2d 548, 555 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
72. See note 27 supra.
73. 67 Neb. 644, 93 N.W. 1024 (1903).
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were not so."74 At least one court has applied this principle to hold
that if none of a corporation's stockholders meets the contemporaneous-ownership requirement,75 the corporation itself may not sue.76
But when a merger involves no carryover shareholders, application of the contemporaneous-ownership and vicarious incapacity
rules seems to subvert the rule of passage by passing the action to a
party unable to bring it. Returning to the previous example, suppose
that M Corporation, which has a right of action against Welsh, sells
all its assets (including rights of action) to S Corporation. If none of
M's shareholders carries over as a shareholder of S, so that none of
S's shareholders satisfies the contemporaneous-ownership requirement, Welsh might argue that the vicarious incapacity principle bars
the suit by S. Yet such an application of vicarious incapacity would
be improper, since it would not advance the purpose of the contemporaneous-ownership requirement: to avoid unjustly enriching parties who suffered no harm.77 When a merger conveys causes of
action, the negotiated price reflects any anticipated recovery, and no
unjust enrichment occurs.

B.

Claims Against Parties Within Arm's Length of the Merged
Corporation's Management

Directors, officers, and principal shareholders are liable to their
corporation for breaches of fiduciary duty. When such breaches occur, innocent shareholders may sue derivatively to recover damages
for the corporation. The guilty parties certainly should not be able
to use their authority or influence in the corporation to compromise
such rights of action and escape personal liability.78
Nevertheless, a merger may present an opportunity for the
merged corporation's management to insulate itself or some close associate79 from liability. 80 If a right of action against the merged cor74. 67 Neb. at 664-65, 93 N.W. at 1032. Accord, Matthews v. Headley Chocolate Co., 130
Md. 523, 535, 100 A. 645, 650 (Ct. App. 1917).
15. See text at note 29 supra.
76. Capitol Wine & Spirit Corp. v. Pokrass, 277 A.D. 184, 98 N.Y.S.2d 291 (1950), qffd.,
302 N.Y. 840, 100 N.E.2d 37 (1951).
77. The requirement does have other purposes. Most notably, it has been used to combat
strike suits and collusive efforts to acquire diversity of citizenship. The irrelevance of those
purposes to mergers is demonstrated in Note, Corporate Incapacity to Sue Where Stocklio/ders
Would Be Barredfrom Suing .Derivatively- TIie Vicarious Incapacity Exception, 54 B.U, L.
REV. 355, 374-77 (1974). The Note concludes that "it is not necessary to mechanically apply
the vicarious incapacity rule; it is feasible for a court to apply the rule only when the purpose
of preventing unjust enrichment is actually advanced." Id. at 377.
78. See 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 6019, at 509 (rev. vol. 1970).
79. Although this Subsection's textual discussion is limited to the most egregious situation
- where the merged corporation's management is itself the defendant - the analysis extends
easily to all situations where the defendant is not at arm's length from the merged corporation's management. See note 70 supra.
80. See Gabhart v. Gabhart, 267 Ind. 370, 390-91, 370 N.E.2d 345, 357 (1977).
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poration's management passes to the surviving corporation, a new
party will have responsibility for pursuing the claim to judgment.
The guilty management may find the surviving corporation a more
agreeable adversary than its own shareholders: if the survivor has a
close relationship with the management, it may hesitate to pursue
the action vigorously.
Allowing the guilty management to insulate itself from liability .
through a merger undermines both purposes of derivative suits: deterrence of misconduct and compensation for injury. 81 For example,
suppose that Clytemnestra is the chairman of the board and majority
shareholder of Mu Corporation, and she has profited by appropriating a corporate opportunity. Minority shareholder Agamemnon is a
potential plaintiff in a derivative action against Clytemnestra requiring her to account to the corporation for her profits. While Agamemnon journeys to the courthouse to file a suit, Clytemnestra sells
all of Mu Corporation's assets to Sigma Corporation, which is controlled by her housemate, Aegisthus. Immediately after the sale, Mu
Corporation is liquidated.82 If the cause of action against Clytemnestra passes to Sigma Corporation by this merger, 83 Clytemnestra
will escape liability and Agamemnon will probably not be compensated. 84
These circumstances pose a classic case for an exception to the
rule of passage.85 The example suggests that reference to the law of
:fiduciaries' conflicts of interest may aid in defining such an exception. Courts usually defer to the business judgment of corporate officers and directors. 86 But when those :fiduciaries have adverse
interests, such as personal contracts with the corporation,87 their
business judgment on that matter is presumed invalid. 88
While courts have applied various standards in analyzing conflict
of interest transactions, the modem trend is to judge them by a
"complete fairness" test.89 For example, in Hirslyield v. Briskin,90
81. See text at notes 59-62 supra.
82. Agamemnon was excusably delayed on his way to the courthouse. See generally AESCHYLUS, AGAMEMNON in 1 GREEK TRAGEDIES I (R. Lattimore trans. 1960). Compare E.
O'NEILL, MOURNING BECOMES ELECTRA (1931).
83. See note 6 supra.
84. The possibility that appraisal would provide adequate compensation is discussed in the
text at notes 108-16 in.fro.
85. The example is couched in terms of a cause of action that predates the merger. The
analysis that follows, however, applies equally well when the cause of action arises out of the
merger.
86. See note 71 supra.
81. See Note, 61 HARV. L. REV. 335 (1948).
88. See 3 W. FLETCHER, supra note I, § 921 (rev. vol. 1975). Such conflicts render the
transaction voidable by the corporation. See id § 913.
89. See H. HENN, supra note 9, § 238, at 467. Professor Henn characterizes the modem
fairness test as follows: "Would an independent corporate fiduciary in an arm's length bargain
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the controlling stockholders of Briskin Corporation approved a corporate loan to another corporation that they personally controlled.
Upon default, the minority shareholder of Briskin sued the controlling stockholders derivatively for breach of fiduciary duty. Since the
defendants' personal interests conflicted with their fiduciary duties,
the court imposed liability for damages "unless defendants succeed
in 'overcoming the presumption against the validity of the transaction by showing its fairness.' " 91
When the management or a close associate is the potential defendant in an action by a merged corporation, the management has a
similar conflict of interest. As corporate officers, they seek recovery;
as individuals, they seek immunity. Because the management's
judgment on a merger might be tainted by this conflict, courts should
determine whether passage of the action to the surviving corporation
treats the shareholders with complete fairness. If not, the action
should not pass.
Complete fairness turns on whether the merged corporation sells
its right of action to the survivor for a fair price.92 Unfortunately,
direct determination of the price's fairness is speculative and cumbersome.- Parties to mergers do not specify how much is paid for
causes of action, and courts have no simple way to calculate that
aniount. 93 Furthermore, it would be unwieldy to review the fairness
of the entire merger any time such a right of action were involved. 94
Yet the complete fairness test need not be cast aside. A court can
estimate the fairness of the purchase price by examining the relationship between the potential defendant and the surviving corporation.
One can expect the survivor to bring legitimate claims that it acquires, as long as it is at arm's length from the defendant. 95 And if the
survivor is apt to bring the action, the parties to the merger will negotiate a fair price for that asset. 96 Therefore, a court can presume
bind his corporation to such a transaction?" Id Formerly, transactions were voidable by virtue of the conflict alone, or the conflict plus fraud or bad faith. Id § 238, at 466-67.
90. 447 F.2d 694 (7th Cir. 1971).
91. 447 F.2d at 697 (quoting Schlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19 Ill. 2d 268, 28081, 166 N.E.2d 793, 800 (1960)).
92. See Co=ent, Going Private - Juggling Shareholder Protection with Corporate Flexibility: Will the States J)rop the Ball?, 1978 W1s. L. REV. 797, 807.
93. Even if such an allocation were possible, causes of action are notoriously difficult to
value. And the problem is particularly acute when the valuation is not of a particular cause of
action, but of a latent cause of action. See generally text at note 68 supra.
94. Such a view would undermine the business judgment rule. See note 71 supra. A
shareholder would thereby be able to force a review of the fairness of any merger by bringing a
suit, however specious, against the directors of the merged corporation.
95. Note that this test - whether the survivor is at arm's length from the defendant differs from the one presented earlier - whether the merged corporation's management is at
arm's length from the defendant. See note 70 supra.
96. This assumption merits brief elaboration. One might think that the manager-defendant in the merged corporation would agree not to extract fair value from the survivor, in
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that the survivor paid fair value for claims against parties at arm's
length. On the other hand, the survivor will not sue parties with
whom it has a close relationship and accordingly will not pay fair
value for claims against such parties.97 In those cases, the merged
corporation's shareholders will not be compensated for their loss.
Illustratively, reconsider the hypothetical in which Clytemnestra
appropriated Mu Corporation's opportunity.98 Recall that Aegisthus, who controls the surviving Sigma Corporation, is the housemate of Clytemnestra, who controls the merged Mu Corporation.
Since Clytemnestra and Aegisthus are not at arm's length, Sigma
Corporation - controlled by Aegisthus - is unlikely ever to sue
Clytemnestra for the wrongful appropriation. Thus, Sigma Corporation has no reason to pay fair value for the claim,99 and the liquidation payment to Agamemnon (a minority shareholder of the merged
corporation) will not include fair consideration for his surrender of
the cause of action. 100 Agamemnon will only be compensated if he
may pursue his claim despite the merger.
To summarize briefly, when the prospective defendant is not at
arm's length from the merged corporation's management, that management faces a conflict of interest. The outcome of such merger
cases should be determined, as in other conflict-of-interest cases, by
the standard of complete fairness. But a conventional approach to
complete fairness - direct evidence of the adequacy of the purchase
price - is cumbersome. Instead, courts should gauge fairness by
looking to the relationship between the prospective defendant and
the surviving corporation. If those parties are at arm's length, the
court should presume101 that complete fairness has been achieved
and should apply the rule of passage. If they are not at arm's length,
the court should create an exception to the rule of passage and let the
exchange for a promise not to sue. Certainly, from the survivor's standpoint, this would be
equivalent to paying fair value for the right to sue and then receiving that amount back in
settlement of the suit. Yet the survivor would be receiving the settlement money not from the
defendant but from the shareholders, a clearly unacceptable result.
The answer to this analysis is that the survivor's promise not to sue would be unenforceable
in a court of law. Since the promise could be made only in a transaction designed to defraud
the merged corporation's shareholders, it is clearly against public policy. And once the promise is unenforceable, it is unlikely that the merged corporation's management would pay very
much for it to someone who is at arm's length.
97. Cf. text at note 72 supra (claims against the survivor).
98. See text at notes 82-84 supra.
99. One could theorize that Aegisthus, via Sigma Corporation, has settled the claim with
Agamemnon. As a practical matter, however, Agamemnon would probably not even be represented in the merger negotiations, so it is specious to say that Agamemnon has consented to a
settlement.
100. Commentators have recognized that in situations of this type, the offered price is
probably inadequate. Bradney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297,298 (1974); Comment, supra note 92, at 807.
IOI. Because of the problems involved with allowing other types of proof, see notes 93 &
94 supra and accompanying text, this presumption should be conclusive, not rebuttable.
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shareholders of the merged corporation sue derivatively for damages.102
C.

Inadequate Alternatives to the Exception

Some courts have argued that alternative shareholder remedies
render exceptions to the rule of passage unnecessary. 103 They have
pointed first to the possibility of direct attack on the merger. Nonconsenting104 shareholders may be able to bring a direct suit against
an illegal merger, seeking damages or injunctive relief. 105 Fraud,
bad faith, and lack of authority are well accepted as sufficient
grounds for illegality. 106 But suits based on illegality offer shareholders insufficient protection: a merger that causes hardship to
some shareholders may nonetheless be legal. 107 Thus, the opportunity for direct attack may be no opportunity at all.
Nor should the second alternative remedy, appraisal, preclude an
exception to the rule of passage. Nearly all jurisdictions have dissenters' rights statutes authorizing shareholders who dissent from a
merger to demand that the surviving corporation purchase their
shares at fair market value, as determined by an appraiser. 108 In
theory, those statutes fully protect minority shareholders, since the
102. Recovery would be on a pro rata basis. See note 55 supra.
103. See, e.g., Gabhart v. Gabhart, 267 Ind. 370, 392, 370 N.E.2d 345, 358 (1977) (excep•
tion unavailable if shareholder had a "prior opportunity for redress").
104. In general, a corporation may not merge without the approval by vote of at least a
majority of its shareholders. 15 W. FLETCHER, supra note I, § 7063 (rev. vol. 1973). Unless
there is fraud, shareholders who have voted in favor of the merger may not question its validity. Id § 7146.
The opportunity to vote on a merger is not itself sufficient to protect each shareholder's
investments. A controlling group could force an unfavorable agreement on the minority
shareholder. Dissenters' rights statutes, designed to remedy this problem, are discussed in the
text at notes 108-16 infra.
105. See 15 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, §§ 7157 (suit allowed), 7158 (injunctive remedy),
& 7162.1 (damage remedy) (rev. vol. 1973).
106. Id § 7160. Though some courts have considered these shareholder suits to be derivative, see, e.g., Lieferant v. Bartell, 36 Misc. 2d 477, 232 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (Sup. Ct. 1962), the
better view treats them as personal rights. See Eisenberg v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 451 F.2d
267 (2d Cir. 1971); H. BALLANTINE, supra note 3, § 143, at 336-37; 15 w. FLETCHER, supra
note 1, § 7158 (rev. vol. 1973); 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE t 23.1.16(1], at 23.1-48 (1976).
Treating such a claim as derivative would raise the very problem this Note addresses.
107. See Gabhart v. Gabhart, 267 Ind. 370, 392, 370 N.E.2d 345, 357-58 (1977). For
example, a merger may improve the company's profitability and thus have a legitimate motive,
even though its e!fect is to squeeze out shareholders at an unfair price.
108. F. O'NEAL, "SQUEEZE-OUTS" OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS§ 5.27, at 326. See, e.g.,
ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT§ 80 (1953), which provides, in part:
Any shareholder of a corporation shall have the right to dissent from any of the following
corporate actions:
(a) Any plan of merger or consolidation to which the corporation is a party; or
(b) Any sale or exchange of all or substantially all of the property and assets of the
corporation not made in the usual and regular course of its business, including a sale in.
dissolution, but not including a sale pursuant to an order of a court having jurisdiction in
the premises or a sale for cash on terms requiring that all or substantially all of the net
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appraiser is expected to weigh every item of value, including corporate causes of action, in deciding the worth of the dissenter's stock. 109
Consequently, some courts have held appraisal to be the exclusive
post-merger remedy for minority shareholders. 110
To see the error in that approach, one must recognize that appraisal is not an exclusive remedy in other contexts. Courts have
consistently denied the exclusivity of appraisal when a federal securities claim is involved. 111 And even for state law claims, the law on
the strictness of the exclusivity is inconsistent. One court commented:
[T]here is no agreement among the authorities. . . . Some authorities
appear to say that the statutory remedy of appraisal is exclusive. . . .
Others say that it may be disregarded and that equity may intervene if
the minority is treated oppressively or unfairly, . . . or if the merger is
tainted with fraud or illegality.11 2

But even if a state's law does make appraisal an exclusive remedy, a court should not construe it to mandate universal application
of the rule of passage. First, causes of action are particularly hard to
value, since recovery is speculative. 113 Second, legislatures enacted
appraisal statutes principally to elµninate injunctive suits that may
delay the mergers; 114 allowing the merged corporation's shareholders
proceeds of sale be distributed to the shareholders in accordance with their respective
interests within one year after the date of sale.
(c) Any plan of exchange to which the corporation is a party as the corporation the
shares of which are to be acquired.
Section 81 of the Act outlines the procedure involved in electing the appraisal remedy.
109. See Wall v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 216 F. 242,244 (D. Mont. 1914), qjfd. sub
nom. Wall v. Parrot -Silver & Copper Co., 244 U.S. 407 (1917); In re Willcox v. Stem, 18
N.Y.2d 195, 204, 219 N.E.2d 401, 405, 273 N.Y.S.2d 38, 45 (1966); Tabulating Card Co. v.
Leidesdorf, 17 Misc. 2d 573, 574, 188 N.Y.S.2d 23, 25 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
ll0. See, e.g., Loeb v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 829, 830 (Del. Ch. 1971); Beloffv.
Consolidated Edison Co., 300 N.Y. 11, 87 N.E.2d 561 (1949) (under a state statute now superseded, the court held the remedy to be exclusive even though it recognized that the appraisal
did not in fact include the value of the cause of action). q: Albert v. Salzman, 41 A.D.2d 501,
505, 344 N.Y.S.2d 457, 461-62, appeal denied, 33 N.Y.2d 520, 352 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1973) (remedy of accounting for gain received by the survivor is unavailable due to availability of appraisal). But cf. N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 55-l 13(b) (1975) (appraisal remedy is "[i]n addition to any
other right he (the shareholder) may have in law or equity").
111. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
112. Bove v. Co=unity Hotel Corp., 105 R.I. 36, 53, 249 A.2d 89, 98-99 (1969). Professor
O'Neal has observed that the issue is "far from settled." F. O'NEAL, supra note 108, § 5.29, at
340. Compare Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369, 375 (D. Del.
1965) (appraisal is not exclusive when the defendant has engaged in fraud), and Ramsburg v.
American Inv. Co., 231 F.2d 333, 340 (7th Cir. 1956) (election of dissenters' remedy did not
involve forfeiture of shareholder status, nor did it foreclose shareholders from suing to enjoin a
merger), with the cases cited in note 110 supra.
113. Accountants, recognizing the difficulty of such valuations, often relegate discussions
of litigation to the footnotes of financial statements. See generally 3 AICPA PROFESSIONAL
STANDARDS (CCH) §§ 4311.33 to .39, 4311-1 (FASB Statement No. 5, Appendix A and Interpretation No. 14). See also F. O'NEAL, supra note 108, § 2.16.
114. At one time, unanimous consent of shareholders was required for merger. As corporations grew larger, this restriction seriously hindered mergers. To remedy the problem states
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a pro rata action for damages does not cause such a delay. Third,
even if appraisal adequately compensates the shareholders, the rule
of passage can destroy much of the derivative suit's deterrent value
because the surviving corporation, not the defendant, bears the
cost. us Finally, some commentators have challenged the efficacy of
appraisal in any context. 116 In sum, neither appraisals nor direct attacks obviate the need for an exception to the rule of passage.
CONCLUSION

Courts have struggled with the rule of passage. Though they
have often reached just results, no court has developed a fair and
generalized standard for determining when the rule should and
should not be applied. This Note has proposed such a standard. To
decide whether a particular claim should pass by merger, one must
answer two questions: (1) Does the merged corporation's management deal at arm's length with the prospective defendant? and (2)
Does the surviving corporation deal at arm's length with the prospective defendant? If the answer to either question is "yes," the
claim should pass to the surviving corporation. If the answer to both
questions is "no," the action should not pass. Instead, the former
shareholders of the merged corporation should be entitled to sue for
damages in a derivative suit.

eliminated the unanimity requirement; but, at the same time, they created dissenters' rights.
See Gabhart v. Gabhart, 267 Ind. 370, 381, 370 N.E.2d 34S, 3S2 (1977); Levy, Rights of l}issenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 420, 420-21 (1930).
I IS. See generally note 62 supra and accompanying text.
116. Dean Manning has argued that in seeking appraisal, the only things of which a shareholder can be certain are "the uncertainty, the delay, and the expense." Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essayfor Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 233 (1962). Professor
O'Neal has objected that the procedure is expensive, that technicalities are apt to foreclose the
dissenter's remedy, that the delay in receiving fair market value is costly, and that the tax laws
discourage use of the procedure. F. O'NEAL, supra note 108, § 5.28. Though a number of
commentators follow Manning and O'Neal in criticizing dissenters' rights statutes, others have
defended the appraisal remedy. Compare Bradney & Chirelstein, supra note 100, at 304-07
(criticizing the remedy) with Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in
Modem Corporate .Decisionmaking, 51 CALIF. L. REV. I, 71-86 (1969) (defending the remedy),
Professor Eisenberg argued that the criticisms of appraisal "indicate not that the remedy is
unsound, but merely that its usefulness, like the usefulness of all legal rights, may be limited by
the boundaries of reality and legislative drafting." Id at 73.

